Note 96 — Chapter VII

Our other American lexicographer, Worcester, who was pretty strict in regard to the words which he admitted into the English language, gives the word "noumenon," but he was careful to designate its arbitrary use. His definition is this:

"Noumenon, n. [Gr. νοῦς, the mind.] In the philosophy of Kant, an object in itself, not relatively to us; opposed to phenomenon. Fleming."

[97] Prof. Huxley, who claims a sort of patent right or priority of invention in the term and doctrine "agnosticism."

[98] "There are some things I know and some things I believe," said the Syrian; "I know that I have a soul, and I believe that it is immortal." ...

"I wish I could assure myself of the personality of the Creator," said Lothair; "I cling to that, but they say it is unphilosophical!" "In what sense," asked the Syrian, "is it more unphilosophical to believe in a personal God, omnipotent and omniscient, than in natural forces, unconscious and irresistible? Is it unphilosophical to combine power with intelligence?"—Disraeli's "Lothair."

[99] The practice of judging of the future by the past is sometimes treated as if it were a mere habit of the uncultivated and undisciplined part of mankind—a kind of mental weakness. Undoubtedly, our past experience is not always an infallible guide to what is to be our experience in the future. We often have to correct our past experience, by carefully separating the accidental from the essential; by more comprehensive analysis of the facts which constitute our former experience. But when we have full, comprehensive, and accurate views of that which has happened to us heretofore, our beliefs in what is to happen to us hereafter are not only attained by a safe process of reasoning, but that process is imposed upon us by a law of our mental constitution.

[100] "Nineteenth Century" for November, 1884, p. 827.

[101] Grote's "Plato," iii, pp. 284, 285.

[102] Grote's "Plato," iii, p. 285, and notes.

[103] Grote's "Plato," iii, p. 181 et seq.

[104] The contradictions between Plato's ideas of the origin of beliefs in the gods, as given in his various writings, are of course unimportant in reference to the present discussion. In the "Timæus," as Mr. Grote has pointed out, Plato "accepts the received genealogy of the gods, upon the authority of the sons and early descendants of the gods. These eons must have known their own fathers; we ought, therefore, to 'follow the law and believe them,' though they spoke without either probable or demonstrative proof.... That which Plato here enjoins to be believed is the genealogy of Hesiod and other poets, though he does not expressly name the poets." (Grote, iii, p. 189, note.) In other words, the sons of the gods are authoritative witnesses to their genealogy, whose ipsi diximus must be believed. On the other hand, in his "Republic" and "Leges," Plato rejects the authority of those witnesses, and boldly proclaims that their legends are fictions, which must be displaced by better fictions, more consonant to a true ethical conception of the characters of the gods. It is the province of the lawgiver to supply these better legends, but they are all the while fictions, although the multitude do not know that they are so. Mr. Grote accounts for these and other discrepancies in the writings of Plato by explaining that his different dialogues are not interdependent productions, but separate disquisitions. (See his admirable and critical examination of the Platonic canon, in Chapters IV, V, VI, of his first volume.)

[105] The reader will understand that I do not assert this to be what astronomers teach, but I maintain it to be a rational deduction from the facts which they furnish to us.

[106] "Biology," i, p. 482.

[107] "Biology," i, Appendix, pp. 483, 484.

[108] "Biology," i, p. 408.

[109] "Biology," i, pp. 409, 410.

[110] "Biology," i, p. 482.

[111] Now contained in "Biology," i, Appendix.

[112] Quoted by M. Guizot in his "History of France," vol. vi, p. 328. Guizot observes that Buffon was "absolutely unshackled by any religious prejudice," and that he "involuntarily recurred to the account given in Genesis."

[113] Probably Kosmicos did not mean that man excels all other animals in the delicacy and perfection of his nervous organization, for some of his senses are inferior to those of some of the other animals, as his movements are less swift. Apparently his meaning is that, taken as a whole, the nervous organization of man evinces the greatest power of variation and the widest range of action.

[114] Darwin's "Descent of Man," pp. 608, 609.

[115] Darwin's "Origin of Species," p. 428.

[116] "The Principles of Psychology," by Herbert Spencer, third edition. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1885.

[117] "Principles of Psychology," i, p. 162.

[118] "Principles of Psychology," ii, p. 503.

[119] "Principles of Psychology," ii, p. 503.

[120] Revised version.

[121] Darwin, "Descent of Man," Part I, chap. iv.

[122] "Descent of Man," Part I, chap. iv.

[123] Quoted in Darwin's "Descent of Man," p. 123.

[124] "Principles of Sociology," i, p. 433, § 202.

[125] Ibid., chap. xxv, p. 414 et seq.

[126] "Principles of Sociology," i, p. 135.

[127] "Principles of Morality," vol. i. I. "The Data of Ethics." By Herbert Spencer. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1884.

[128] "The Data of Ethics," pp. 6, 7, by Herbert Spencer. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1884.

[129] "The Data of Ethics," pp. 45, 46, by Herbert Spencer. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1884.

[130] "Data of Ethics," chap. xv.

[131] Ibid.

[132] Revised version of St. Mark's gospel.

[133] The late Jeremiah S. Black is the person whose language is here quoted, although it was used with reference to something else.

[134] This does not imply that the punishment inflicted by society is to be always the same. It implies only that there is to be some punishment, so long as the prohibited act continues to be committed.

[135] "Principles of Psychology," vol. i, pp. 503, 504, § 220.

[136] Statical: pertaining to bodies at rest or in equilibrium.

Dynamical: pertaining to strength or power.

Dynamics: that part of mechanical philosophy which treats of bodies in motion; opposed to statics. ("Webster's Dictionary.")

[137] "Principles of Psychology," vol. ii, p. 484, et seq.

[138] "Webster's Dictionary." Plexus.

[139] Corinthians, revised version.

[140] In the "authorized" version the passage is rendered thus: "There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body." Sophereus quotes the late revised version. The meaning is the same. St. Paul assumes the existence of a natural body, and then asserts that there is likewise a spiritual body.

[141] I have met, by the kindness of the author, with a little treatise which contains a great deal of sound mental philosophy, with which in the main I concur, and to which I am indebted for some very valuable suggestions. This modest little book is entitled "The Heart of Man: An Attempt in Mental Anatomy." The author is Mr. P. P. Bishop, a resident of San Mateo, in Florida. It was printed at Chicago, by Shepard & Johnson, for the author, in 1883. I know not if it is on sale. I suppose that Mr. Bishop was led to send me his interesting treatise by the publication, in the "Manhattan Magazine," at New York, in 1884, of the substance of the first three chapters of the present work. I take this opportunity of expressing my high appreciation of his treatise, and of explaining the meaning of its title. As I understand him, he uses the term "Heart of Man" as synonymous with structure of the mind, and not as referring to what is figuratively called "the human heart." He has explained "Mental Anatomy" as follows: "The method of investigation, which I have employed in making my way to the conclusions set forth in this discussion, I call 'The Anatomical Method,' because it is based on the conception of mind as an organized being, and aims to discover the structure of that being." ... "At the risk," he adds, "of appearing egotistical, I think it best to relate an experience." He did not need to deprecate the appearance of egotism, for his method of investigation, based on his own mental experience, was the very best that he could have followed. It were to be wished that we could have more of this kind of self-analysis by persons competent to make it, and less of theoretical reasoning from premises more or less arbitrarily assumed.

I have endeavored to make my imaginary philosopher, Sophereus, avoid the method of reasoning which I thus condemn, and to keep him within the bounds of experience.

[142] "Extemporaneous," Latin, ex, from; and tempus, time, at the same time, or from the same time. Extemporaneous discourse is when the thought and the expression in which it is clothed occur at the time it is uttered, or without premeditation of both thought and language. "Improvisation" means the same thing, but it is specially applied to the act of making poetry or performing music extemporaneously, that is, without prevision of what one is to say or sing. Rapid conversation is of the same nature. So is an instantaneous and unpremeditated answer to a question.

[143] Webster's Dictionary—"Matter."

[144] "And it shall be as when a hungry man dreameth, and behold, he eateth: but he awaketh, and his soul is empty; or as when a thirsty man dreameth, and behold, he drinketh: but he awaketh, and behold, he is faint, and his soul hath appetite."—Isaiah.

[145] Scott's "Antiquary," note v.

[146] If it is objected that I have allowed Sophereus to overstate the power of the mind to deal better with difficulties after "a good night's sleep," as we say, than it had dealt with them before, I will cite the testimony of one of the most prolific of writers and one of the most self-observing of men, Sir Walter Scott, whose greatest success was achieved in the field of poetical and prose fiction. This is a department in which inventive genius is the main reliance, and is put to its greatest tasks. In that part of Scott's "Diary" which covers the year 1826—the period when he was writing "Woodstock"—he says:

"The half-hour between waking and rising has all my life proved propitious to any task which was exercising my invention. When I got over any knotty difficulty in a story, or have had in former times to fill up a passage in a poem, it was always when I first opened my eyes that the desired ideas thronged upon me. This is so much the case that I am in the habit of relying upon it and saying to myself when I am at a loss, 'Never mind, we shall have it at seven o'clock to-morrow morning.' If I have forgot a circumstance, a name, or a copy of verses, it is the same thing.... This morning I had some new ideas respecting 'Woodstock' which will make the story better." (Lockhart's "Life of Scott," vol. viii, chap. lxviii.)

This, it is true, was the experience of a man of extraordinary genius, whose facility of invention was as marvelous as the ease and rapidity with which he wrote. But his experience was a very common one. It has been shared by persons of much more humble faculties. I am sure that persons in my own profession, who have been engaged in pursuits very different from those of the poet or the novelist, will, from their own experience, confirm what is assumed by Sophereus as a well-known mental phenomenon. I could describe in detail many instances in which I have gone through with the same fruition of new ideas, resulting from the acquisitions obtained during sleep, or following from the benefits of sleep. For example, when having to do with a complex state of facts, needing orderly arrangement and analysis, it has repeatedly happened to me to rise in the morning after a night of undisturbed sleep, with the whole of an entangled skein unraveled, whereas before retiring to rest the mass of facts lay in some confusion in the mind. In like manner the mind can often deal with a legal question of a new and difficult character. The rule that ought to be applied to a particular case has to be extracted from many precedents, and perhaps none of them exactly cover the case in hand. On such occasions, if one refrains from pushing the study of his subject while awake to the severest analysis, and postpones the effort until the next morning, the experience of Sir Walter is very likely to be repeated. "It was always," he says, "when I first opened my eyes that the desired ideas thronged upon me." I am persuaded, therefore, that although in the study of any subject omission to master all its elements and details, when alone one can accumulate them, is not to be recommended, there is undoubtedly much to be gained by relieving the mind from the continued effort, and allowing some hours of sleep to intervene, during which the mind can act independently of all the bodily organs.

The question is, then, as above suggested, whether there come to us during sleep acquisitions of new ideas with or without a simultaneous consciousness that we are thinking of the subject, or whether the new ideas follow from the benefits of sleep as a state of absolute rest and inactivity of the brain, and of the intellectual faculties, so that when we awake both the brain and the mental powers are in greater vigor. The expression used by Scott in describing his own experience is that as soon as he awoke the desired ideas thronged upon him. This might happen upon the hypothesis that the desired ideas came because the brain and the mental powers, refreshed by sleep, were in greater vigor. But I incline to believe that his meaning was the reverse of this. At all events, it seems to me that the true explanation of the phenomenon is that during sound and undisturbed sleep of the body, including the brain, we do unconsciously think of the subject on which our waking thoughts had been previously employed; that in these states there are acquisitions of new ideas which we bring with us out of the state in which they were acquired, or, as Sir Walter expressed it, which throng upon us as soon as we open our eyes. While, therefore, it may be said that this hypothesis assumes the existence of the mind as a spiritual or intellectual entity capable of action as a thinking being without any action of the bodily organs, the question is, on the other hand, whether the phenomena here considered have not a very strong tendency to prove that the mind is such a substantive and independent existence. When it is remembered how common is the experience here referred to, how various the phenomena are, how they are manifested on all kinds of subjects, in regard to lines of conduct, and to everything about which we are perplexed, and when we add these peculiar phenomena to the other evidence which tends to establish the same belief in the existence of the mind as something entirely apart from all its physical environment, it seems to me that the argument becomes very strong, and that I have not made my imaginary philosopher press it beyond its legitimate bounds.

[147] Do him every honor.

[148] By some commentators, this hint, given with female subtilty, is explained to mean that their copy-hold, or lease, by which Banquo and his son hold their lives, is not eternal. The more probable meaning is that, if they are cut off, nature will produce no more copies of their race. But in either meaning the hint that she gave was the same, and it included both Banquo and his son.

[149] When the unknowable power ceases to pulsate through our physical organism, this "mental state" ceases—nothing survives—continuity is ended.

[150] "Principles of Psychology," i, § 208, pp. 465-471.

[151] I have allowed Sophereus to follow in the main the writer to whom I have already referred in the note on page 471—Mr. Bishop, of Florida.

[152] Bishop.

[153] Introduction to Taine's "History of English Literature," translated by H. Van Laun. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1885.