Note 261 — QUARRELS OF AUTHORS; (continued 2)

The ninth chapter in the “Plus Ultra,” entitled “The Credit of Optic Glasses vindicated against a disputing man, who is afraid to believe his eyes against Aristotle,” gives one of the ludicrous incidents of this philosophical visit. The disputer raised a whimsical objection against the science of optics, insisting that the newly-invented glasses, the telescope, the microscope, &c., were all deceitful and fallacious; for, said the Aristotelian, “take two spectacles, use them at the same time, and you will not see so well as with one singly—ergo, your microscopes and telescopes are impostors.” How this was forced into a syllogism does not appear; but still the conclusion ran, “We can see better through one pair than two, therefore all perspectives are fallacious!”

One proposition for sense, And t’other for convenience,

will make a tolerable syllogism for a logician in despair. The Aristotelian was, however, somewhat puzzled by a problem which he had himself raised—“Why we cannot see with two pair of spectacles better than with one singly?” for the man of axioms observed, “Vis unita fortior,” “United strength is stronger.” It is curious enough, in the present day, to observe the sturdy Aristotelian denying these discoveries, and the praises of optics, and “the new glasses,” by Glanvill. “If this philosopher,” says the member of the Royal Society, “had spared some of those thoughts to the profitable doctrine of optics which he hath spent upon genus and species, we had never heard of this objection.” And he replies to the paradox which the Aristotelian had raised by “Why cannot he write better with two pens than with a single one, since Vis unita fortior? When he hath answered this Quære, he hath resolved his own. The reason he gave why it should be so, is the reason why ’tis not.” Such are the squabbles of infantine science, which cannot as yet discover causes, although it has ascertained effects.