Note 52 — LETTERS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY.
Reading edition
The Gazette's criticism on the previous letter had concluded thus:
The following questions exhaust the points at issue between Mr. Ruskin and ourselves:
Is every man bound to purchase any service or any goods offered him at a "just" price, he having the money?
If yes, there is an end of private property.
If no, the purchaser must be at liberty to refuse to buy if it suits his interest to do so. Suppose he does refuse, and thereupon the seller offers to lower his price, it being his interest to do so, is the purchaser at liberty to accept that offer?
If yes, the whole principle of bargaining is admitted, and the "justice" of the price becomes immaterial.
If no, each party of the supposition is compelled by justice to sacrifice their interest. Why should they do so?
The following is an example: The "just" price of a guide up Mont Blanc is (suppose) 100 francs. I have only 50 francs to spare. May I without injustice offer the 50 francs to a guide, who would otherwise get nothing, and may he without injustice accept my offer? If not, I lose my excursion, and he loses his opportunity of earning 50 francs. Why should this be?
In addition to the above interpolations, the Gazette appended a note to this letter, in which it declared its definition of justice to be a quotation from memory of Austin's definition adopted by him from Hobbes, and after referring Mr. Ruskin to Austin for the moral bearings of the question, concluded by summing up its views, which it doubted if Mr. Ruskin understood, and insisting on the definition of "justice" as "conformity with any rule whatever, good or bad," and on that of good rules as "those which promote the general happiness of those whom they affect." (See the next letter.)