Note 61 — Chapter VII · ANALYTICA POSTERIORA I.

Ibid. xxi. p. 82, b. 35; xxii. p. 84, a. 7: λογικῶς μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ἄν τις πιστεύσειε περὶ τοῦ λεχθέντος, ἀναλυτικῶς δὲ διὰ τῶνδε φανερὸν συντομώτερον. In Scholia, p. 227, a. 42, the same distinction is expressed by Philoponus in the terms λογικώτερα and πραγματωδέστερα. Compare Biese, Die Philosophie des Aristoteles, pp. 134, 261; Bassow, De Notionis Definitione, pp. 19, 20; Heyder, Aristot. u. Hegel. Dialektik, pp. 316, 317.

Aristotle, however, does not always adhere closely to the distinction. Thus, if we compare the logical or dialectical reasons given, p. 82, b. 37, seq., with the analytical, announced as beginning p. 84, a. 8, seq., we find the same main topic dwelt upon in both, namely, that to admit an infinite series excludes the possibility of Definition. Both Alexander and Ammonius agree in announcing this as the capital topic on which the proof turned; but Alexander inferred from hence that the argument was purely dialectical (λογικὸν ἐπιχείρημα), while Ammonius regarded it as a reason thoroughly convincing and evident: ὁ μέντοι φιλόσοφος (Ammonius) ἔλεγε μὴ διὰ τοῦτο λέγειν λογικὰ τὰ ἐπιχειρήματα· ἐναργὲς γὰρ ὅτι εἰσὶν ὁρισμοί, εἰ μὴ ἀκαταληψίαν εἰσαγάγωμεν (Schol. p. 227, a. 40, seq., Brand.).