Note 17 — Chapter VII · ANALYTICA POSTERIORA I.
Reading edition
Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. iv. p. 73, b. 25-p. 74, a. 3. ὃ τοίνυν τὸ τυχὸν πρῶτον δείκνυται δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχον ἢ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο, τούτῳ πρώτῳ ὑπάρχει καθόλου, καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις καθ’ αὑτὸ τούτου καθόλου ἐστὶ, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων τρόπον τινὰ οὐ καθ’ αὑτό· οὐδὲ τοῦ ἰσοσκέλους οὐκ ἔστι καθόλου ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ πλέον.
About the precise signification of καθόλου in Aristotle, see a valuable note of Bonitz (ad Metaphys. Z. iii.) p. 299; also Waitz (ad Aristot. De Interpr. c. vii.) I. p. 334. Aristotle gives it here, b. 26: καθόλου δὲ λέγω ὃ ἂν κατὰ παντός τε ὑπάρχῃ καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸ καὶ ᾗ αὐτό. Compare Themistius, Paraphr. p. 19, Spengel. Τὸ καθ’ αὑτό is described by Aristotle confusedly. Τὸ καθόλου, is that which is predicable of the subject as a whole or summum genus: τὸ κατὰ παντός, that which is predicable of every individual, either of the summum genus or of any inferior species contained therein. Cf. Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 85, b. 24: ᾧ γὰρ καθ’ αὑτὸ ὑπάρχει τι, τοῦτο αὐτὸ αὑτῷ αἴτιον — the subject is itself the cause or fundamentum of the properties per se. See the explanation and references in Kampe, Die Erkenntniss-theorie des Aristoteles, ch. v. pp. 160-165.