Note 306 — VI.
Reading edition
Ibid. viii. p. 146, a. 36-b. 19. This is a subtle distinction. He says that desire must be defined (not desire of the pleasurable, but) desire of pleasure: we desire the pleasurable for the sake of pleasure. He admits, however, that there are cases in which the argument will not hold: σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι ἥδεσθαι μᾶλλον βούλονται ἢ πεπαῦσθαι ἡδόμενοι· ὥστε τὸ ἐνεργεῖν μᾶλλον τέλος ἂν ποιοῖντο τοῦ ἐνηργηκέναι.