Note 229 — V.

Topic. V. iv. p. 133, b. 15-p. 134, a. 4. πρὸς γὰρ τὸν πάντως ἐνιστάμενον, πάντως ἀντιτακτέον ἐστίν. It appears to me that Aristotle is not entitled to treat this objection as sophistical (i.e. as unfair Dialectic). He is here considering predication as Proprium, contrasted with predication as Accident. What is true as an accident respecting homo albus, will also be true as an accident respecting homo: but what is true as a proprium respecting homo albus, will not be true as a proprium respecting homo — nor vice versâ. This is a good locus for objections in predication of Proprium. There is a real distinction between homo and homo albus; between Koriskus and Koriskus albus: and one of the ways of elucidating that distinction is by pointing out that the proprium of one is not the same as the proprium of the other. Aristotle treats those who dwelt upon this distinction as Sophists: what their manner of noticing it may have been he does not clearly tell us; but if we are to have that logical accuracy of speech which his classification and theory demand, this distinction must undoubtedly be brought to view among the rest.