Note 220 — V.

Ibid. p. 132, a. 22-27. πότερον μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἢ οὐ καλῶς ἀποδέδοται τὸ ἴδιον, διὰ τῶνδε σκεπτέον· πότερον δ’ ἴδιόν ἐστιν ὅλως τὸ εἰρημένον ἢ οὐκ ἴδιον, ἐκ τῶνδε θεωρητέον.

The distinction here noted by Aristotle (between the two questions:— (1) Whether the alleged Proprium is well set out or clearly described? (2) Whether the alleged Proprium is a Proprium at all?) is not carried out, nor indeed capable of being carried out, with strict precision. The two heads of questions run together and become confounded. Alexander remarks (Scholia, p. 284, b. 24-46, Br.) that the three or four last-mentioned loci under the first head embrace the second head also. He allows only three loci as belonging peculiarly to the first head — τοῦ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδεδόσθαι τὸ ἴδιον:— (1) Equivocal terms; (2) Predicate not reciprocating or co-extensive with subject; (3) Predicate not more knowable than subject. The other loci (besides these three) enumerated by Aristotle under the first head, Alexander considers as belonging equally to the second head. But he commends Aristotle for making a distinction between the two heads: οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἀπηλλοτριωμένον τούτων, καὶ μὴ ἔχον ὁμωνύμους φωνὰς ἤ τι τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ ἴδιον ῥητέον ἐξ ἀνάγκης. The manner in which M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire explains this nice distinction is not clear to me (Note to his translation of Topica, p. 177).