Note 28 — Chapter IV · DE INTERPRETATIONE.

Aristot. De Interpr. p. 19, b. 31. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγεται, οὕτω τέτακται.

Waitz in his note suggests that instead of τέτακται we ought to read τετάχθω. But if we suppose that the formal table once existed in the text, in an order of arrangement agreeing with the Analytica, this conjectural change would be unnecessary.

Waitz has made some changes in the text of this chapter, which appear to me partly for the better, partly not for the better. Both Bekker and Bussemaker (Firmin Didot) retain the old text; but this old text was a puzzle to the ancient commentators, even anterior to Alexander of Aphrodisias. I will here give first the text of Bekker, next the changes made by Waitz: my own opinion does not wholly coincide with either. I shall cite the text from p. 19, b. 19, leaving out the portion between lines 30 and 36, which does not bear upon the matter here discussed, while it obscures the legitimate sequence of Aristotle’s reasoning.

(Bekker.) — Ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἔστι τρίτον προσκατηγορῆται, ἤδη διχῶς λέγονται αἱ ἀντιθέσεις. λέγω δὲ οἷον ἔστι δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος· τὸ ἔστι τρίτον φημὶ συγκεῖσθαι ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα ἐν τῇ καταφάσει. ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο τέτταρα ἔσται ταῦτα, ὧν τὰ μὲν δύο πρὸς τὴν κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν ἕξει κατὰ τὸ στοιχοῦν ὡς αἱ στερήσεις, τὰ δὲ δύο, οὔ. λέγω δ’ ὅτι τὸ ἔστιν ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ προσκείσεται ἢ τῷ οὐ δικαίῳ (25), ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις. τέτταρα οὖν ἔσται. (Here follow the first pairs of Antitheses, or the first Quaternion of propositions in the order as given) —

(A) ἔστι δίκιος ἄνθρωπος … … … … (B) οὐκ ἔστι δίκιος ἄνθρωπος.

(C) ἔστιν οὐ δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος … … … … (D) οὐκ ἔστιν οὐ δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος.

τὸ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστι τῷ δικαίῳ προσκείσεται καὶ τῷ οὐ δικαίῳ (30). — Αὗται μὲν οὖν δύο ἀντίκεινται, ἄλλαι δὲ δύο πρὸς τὸ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ὡς ὑποκείμενόν τι (38) προστεθέν. (Here follow the second pairs of Antitheses, or the second Quaternion of propositions, again in the order from which I have departed above) —

(E) ἔστι δίκαιος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος … … … … (F) Οὐκ ἔστι δίκαιος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος.

(G) ἔστιν οὐ δίκαιος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος … … … … (H) Οὐκ ἔστιν οὐ δίκαιος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος.

πλείους δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔσονται ἀντιθέσεις. αὗται δὲ (the second Quaternion) χωρὶς ἐκείνων (first Quaternion) αὐταὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὰς ἔσονται, ὡς ὀνόματι τῷ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος χρώμεναι.

In this text Waitz makes three alterations:— 1. In line 24, instead of ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ προσκείσεται ἢ τῷ οὐ δικαίῳ — he reads, ἢ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ προσκείσεται ἢ τῷ οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ.

2. In line 30 he makes a similar change; instead of τῷ δικαίῳ προσκείσεται καὶ τῷ οὐ δικαίῳ — he reads, τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ προσκείσεται καὶ τῷ οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ.

In line 38, instead of προστεθέν, he reads προστεθέντος.

Of these three alterations the first appears to me good, but insufficient; the second not good, though the passage as it stands in Bekker requires amendment; and the third, a change for the worse.

The purpose of Aristotle is here two-fold. First, to give the reason why, when the propositions were tertii adjacentis, there were two Quaternions or four couples of antithetical propositions; whereas in propositions secundi adjacentis, there was only one Quaternion or two couples of antithetical propositions. Next, to assign the distinction between the first and the second Quaternion in propositions tertii adjacentis.

Now the first of these two purposes is marked out in line 25, which I think we ought to read not by substituting the words of Waitz in place of the words of Bekker, but by retaining the words of Bekker and inserting the words of Waitz as an addition to them. The passage after such addition will stand thus — λέγω δ’ ὅτι τὸ ἔστιν ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ προσκείσεται ἢ τῷ οὐ δικαίῳ, καὶ ἢ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ τῷ οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις. τέτταρα οὖν ἔσται. Here Aristotle declares the reason why (οὖν) there come to be four couples of propositions; that reason is, because ἔστι and οὐκ ἔστι may be joined either with δίκαιος or οὐ δίκαιος and either with ἄνθρωπος or with οὐκ ἄνθρωπος. Both these alternatives must be specified in order to make out a reason why there are two Quaternions or four couples of antithetical propositions. But the passage, as read by Bekker, gives only one of these alternatives, while the passage, as read by Waitz, gives only the other. Accordingly, neither of them separately is sufficient; but both of them taken together furnish the reason required, and thus answer Aristotle’s purpose.

Aristotle now proceeds to enunciate the first of the two Quaternions, and then proceeds to line 30, where the reading of Bekker is irrelevant and unmeaning; but the amendment of Waitz appears to me still worse, being positively incorrect in statement of fact. Waitz reads τὸ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐνταῦθα (in the first Quaternion, which has just been enunciated) καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστιν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ προσκείσεται καὶ τῷ οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ. These last words are incorrect in fact, for οὐκ ἄνθρωπος does not appear in the first Quaternion, but is reserved for the second. While the reading of Waitz is thus evidently wrong, that of Bekker asserts nothing to the purpose. It is useless to tell us merely that ἔστι and οὐκ ἔστιν attach both to δίκαιος and to οὐ δίκαιος in this first Quaternion (ἐνταῦθα), because that characteristic is equally true of the second Quaternion (presently to follow), and therefore constitutes no distinction between the two. To bring out the meaning intended by Aristotle I think we ought here also to retain the words of Bekker, and to add after them some, though not all, of the words of Waitz. The passage would then stand thus — τὸ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστι τῷ δικαίῳ προσκείσεται καὶ τῷ οὐ δικαίῳ, καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῷ οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ. Or perhaps καὶ οὐ τῷ οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ might suffice in the last clause (being a smaller change), though ἀλλ’ οὐ seem the proper terms to declare the meaning. In the reading which I propose, the sequence intended by Aristotle is clear and intelligible. Having first told us that ἔστιν and οὐκ ἔστι being joined alternately with δίκαιος and with οὐ δίκαιος and also with ἄνθρωπος and οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, make up two Quaternions, he proceeds to enunciate the distinctive character belonging to the first Quaternion of the two, viz., that in it ἔστι and οὐκ ἔστιν are joined both with δίκαιος and οὐ δίκαιος, and also with ἄνθρωπος but not with οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, This is exactly the truth.

Aristotle next proceeds to the second Quaternion, where he points out, as the characteristic distinction, that οὐκ ἄνθρωπος comes in and ἄνθρωπος disappears, while δίκαιος and οὐ δίκαιος remain included, as in the first. This is declared plainly by Aristotle in line 37:— αὗται μὲν οὖν δύο ἀντίκεινται (referring to the two pairs of antithetical propositions in the first Quaternion), ἄλλαι δὲ πρὸς τὸ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ὡς ὑποκείμενόν τι προστεθέν· ἔστι δίκαιος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, ἔστιν οὐ δίκαιος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος-οὐκ ἔστι δίκαιος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, ἔστιν οὐ δίκαιος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος-οὐκ ἔστιν οὐ δίκαιος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος. When we read these words, ἄλλαι δὲ δύο πρὸς τὸ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ὡς ὑποκείμενόν τι προστεθέν, as applied to the second Quaternion, we see that there must have been some words preceding which excluded οὐκ ἄνθρωπος from the first Quaternion. Waitz contends for the necessity of changing προστεθέν into προστεθέντος. I do not concur with his reasons for the change; the words that follow, p. 20, line 2, ὡς ὀνόματι τῷ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος χρώμεναι (προσχρώμεναἰ), are a reasonable justification of προστεθέν — οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ὡς ὑποκείμενόν τι προστεθέν being very analogous to οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ὡς ὄνομα.

This long note, for the purpose of restoring clearness to an obscure text, will appear amply justified if the reader will turn to the perplexities and complaints of the ancient Scholiasts, revealed by Ammonius and Boethius. Even earlier than the time of Alexander (Schol. p. 122, b. 47) there was divergence in the MSS. of Aristotle; several read τῷ δικαίῳ (p. 19, b. 25), several others read τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. I think that all of them were right in what they retained, and wrong by omission only or mainly.