Note 105 — Chapter III · CATEGORIÆ.

See Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, p. 117, seq.

The remarks made by Mr. John Stuart Mill (in his System of Logic, book i. ch. iii.) upon the Aristotelian Categories, and the enlarged philosophical arrangement which he introduces in their place, well deserve to be studied. After enumerating the ten Predicaments, Mr. Mill says:— “It is a mere catalogue of the distinctions rudely marked out by the language of familiar life, with little or no attempt to penetrate, by philosophic analysis, to the rationale even of these common distinctions. Such an analysis would have shewn the enumeration to be both redundant and defective. Some objects are omitted, and others repeated several times under different heads.” (Compare the remarks of the Stoic commentators, and Porphyry, Schol. p. 48, b. 10 Br.: ἀθετοῦντες τὴν διαίρεσιν ὡς πολλὰ παριεῖσαν καὶ μὴ περιλαμβάνουσαν, ἢ καὶ πάλιν πλεονάζουσαν. And Aristotle himself observes that the same predicates might be ranked often under more than one head.) “That could not be a very comprehensive view of the nature of Relation, which could exclude action, passivity, and local situation from that category. The same objection applies to the categories Quando (or position in time), and Ubi (or position in space); while the distinction between the latter and Situs (Κεῖσθαι) is merely verbal. The incongruity of erecting into a summum genus the tenth Category is manifest. On the other hand, the enumeration takes no notice of any thing but Substances and Attributes. In what Category are we to place sensations, or any other feelings and states of mind? as hope, joy, fear; sound, smell, taste; pain, pleasure; thought, judgment, conception, and the like? Probably all these would have been placed by the Aristotelian school in the Categories of Actio and Passio; and the relation of such of them as are active, to their objects, and of such of them as are passive, to their causes, would have been rightly so placed; but the things themselves, the feelings or states of mind, wrongly. Feelings, or states of consciousness, are assuredly to be counted among realities; but they cannot be reckoned either among substances or among attributes.”

Among the many deficiencies of the Aristotelian Categories, as a complete catalogue, there is none more glaring than the imperfect conception of Πρός τι (the Relative), which Mr. Mill here points out. But the Category Κεῖσθαι (badly translated by commentators Situs, from which Aristotle expressly distinguishes it, Categor. p. 6, b. 12: τὸ δὲ ἀνακεῖσθαι ἢ ἑστάναι ἢ καθῆσθαι αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶ θέσεις) appears to be hardly open to Mr. Mill’s remark, that it is only verbally distinguished from Ποῦ, Ubi. Κεῖσθαι is intended to mean posture, attitude, &c. It is a reply to the question, In what posture is Sokrates? Answer. — He is lying down, standing upright, kneeling, πὺξ προτείνων, &c. This is quite different from the question, Where is Sokrates? In the market-place, in the palæstra, &c. Κεῖσθαι (as Aristotle himself admits, Categ. p. 6, b. 12) is not easily distinguished from Πρός τι: for the abstract and general word θέσις (position) is reckoned by Aristotle under Πρός τι, though the paronyma ἀνακεῖσθαι, ἑστάναι, καθῆσθαι are affirmed not to be θέσεις, but to come under the separate Category Κεῖσθαι. But Κεῖσθαι is clearly distinguishable from Ποῦ Ubi.

Again, to Mr. Mill’s question, “In what Category are we to place sensations or other states of mind — hope, fear, sound, smell, pain, pleasure, thought, judgment,” &c.? Aristotle would have replied (I apprehend) that they come under the Category either of Quale or of Pati — Ποιότητες or Πάθη. They are attributes or modifications of Man, Kallias, Sokrates, &c. If the condition of which we speak be temporary or transitory, it is a πάθος, and we speak of Kallias as πάσχων τι; if it be a durable disposition or capacity likely to pass into repeated manifestations, it is ποιότης, and we describe Kallias as ποιός τις (Categ. p. 9, a. 28-p. 10 a. 9). This equally applies to mental and bodily conditions (ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη λέγεται. — p. 9, b. 33). The line is dubious and difficult between πάθος and ποιότης, but one or other of the two will comprehend all the mental states indicated by Mr. Mill. Aristotle would not have admitted that “feelings are to be counted among realities,” except as they are now or may be the feelings of Kallias, Sokrates, or some other Hic Aliquis — one or many. He would consider feelings as attributes belonging to these Πρῶται Οὐσίαι; and so in fact Mr. Mill himself considers them (p. 83), after having specified the Mind (distinguished from Body or external object) as the Substance to which they belong.

Mr. Mill’s classification of Nameable Things is much better and more complete than the Aristotelian Categories, inasmuch as it brings into full prominence the distinction between the subjective and objective points of view, and, likewise, the all-pervading principle of Relativity, which implicates the two; whereas, Aristotle either confuses the one with the other, or conceives them narrowly and inadequately. But we cannot say, I think, that Aristotle, in the Categories, assigns no room for the mental states or elements. He has a place for them, though he treats them altogether objectively. He takes account of himself only as an object — as one among the πρῶται οὐσίαι, or individuals, along with Sokrates and Kallias.