Note 25 — WORDS.

Bishop Wilkins gives the following elegant investigation of the Modes in his Real Character, Part iii. Chap. 5.

“To shew in what manner the Subject is to be joined with his Predicate, the Copula between them is affected with a Particle, which from the use of it is called Modus, the manner or Mode.

Now the Subject and Predicate may be joined together either Simply, or with some kind of Limitation; and accordingly these Modes are Primary or Secondary.

The Primary Modes are called by Grammarians Indicative and Imperative.

When the matter is declared to be so, or at least when it seems in the Speaker’s power to have it be so, as the bare union of Subject and Predicate would import, then the Copula is nakedly expressed without any variation: and this manner of expressing it is called the Indicative Mode.

When it is neither declared to be so, nor seems immediately in the Speaker’s power to have it so; then he can do no more in words but make out the expression of his will to him that hath the thing in his power; namely to

his { Superior } by { Petition, }

{ Equal } { Persuasion, }

{ Inferior } { Command. }

And the manner of these affecting the Copula, (Be it so, or, let it be so,) is called the Imperative Mode; of which there are these three varieties very fit to be distinctly provided for. As for that other use of the Imperative Mode, when it signifies Permission; this may be sufficiently expressed by the Secondary Mode of Liberty; You may do it.

The Secondary Modes are such, as, when the Copula is affected with any of them, make the Sentence to be (as the Logicians call it) a Modal Proposition.

This happens, when the matter in discourse, namely, the being, or doing, or suffering of a thing, is considered, not simply by itself, but gradually in its causes, from which it proceeds contingently, or necessarily.

Then a thing seems to be left Contingent, when the Speaker expresses only the Possibility of it, or his own Liberty to it.

1. The Possibility of a thing depends upon the power of its cause; and may be expressed

when { Absolute } by the Particle { Can,

{ Conditional } { Could.

2. The Liberty of a thing depends upon a freedom from all obstacles either within or without, and is usually expressed in our language

when { Absolute } by the Particle { May,

{ Conditional } { Might.

Then a thing seems to be of Necessity, when the Speaker expresseth the resolution of his own will, or some other obligation upon him from without.

3. The Inclination of the Will is expressed,

if { Absolute } by the Particle { Will,

{ Conditional } { Would.

4. The Necessity of a thing from some external Obligation, whether Natural, or Moral, which we call Duty, is expressed,

if { Absolute } by the Particle { Must, ought, shall;

{ Conditional } { Must, ought, should.”

See also Hermes, Book I. Chap. viii.