Note 153 — Chapter II · NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE (continued 5)
Reading edition
Bennett v. Louisville R. Co., 102 U. S. 577; Alabama Steel Co. v. Clements, 146 Ala. 259; Hobart Tie Co. v. Keck, 89 Ark. 122; Whitney v. New York R. Co., 87 Conn. 623; Christopher v. Russell, 63 Fla. 191; Southern Express Co. v. Williamson, 66 Fla. 286; Horton v. Harvey, 119 Ga. 219; Latham v. Roach, 72 Ill. 179; Spry Lumber Co. v. Duggan, 182 Ill. 218; Calvert v. Springfield Electric Co., 231 Ill. 290; Laurie v. McCullough, 174 Ind. 477; Young v. People’s Gas Co., 128 Ia. 290; Anderson v. Hair, 103 Ky. 196; Carleton v. Franconia Iron Co., 99 Mass. 216; McDermott v. Sallaway, 198 Mass. 517; Marston v. Reynolds, 211 Mass. 590; Jacobsen v. Simons, 217 Mass. 194; Samuelson v. Cleveland Iron Co., 49 Mich. 164; Donaldson v. Wilson, 60 Mich. 86; Pelton v. Schmidt, 104 Mich. 345; Nash v. Minneapolis Mill Co., 24 Minn. 501; Emery v. Minneapolis Exposition, 56 Minn. 460; Kean v. Schoening, 103 Mo. App. 77; Shaw v. Goldman, 116 Mo. App. 332; Montague v. Hanson, 38 Mont. 376; Land v. Fitzgerald, 68 N. J. Law, 28; Smith v. Jackson, 70 N. J. Law, 183; Ackert v. Lansing, 59 N. Y. 646; Weller v. Consolidated Gas Co., 198 N. Y. 98; Wilson v. Olano, 28 App. Div. 448; Withers v. Brooklyn Exchange, 106 App. Div. 255; Higgins v. Ruppert, 124 App. Div. 530; Massey v. Seller, 45 Or. 267; Newingham v. Blair, 232 Pa. St. 511; Freer v. Cameron, 4 Rich. Law, 228; League v. Stradley, 68 S. C. 515; Richmond R. Co. v. Moore, 94 Va. 493; Smith v. Parkersburg Ass’n, 48 W. Va. 232; Landry v. Great Northern R. Co., 152 Wis. 379 Accord.
As to child accompanying invitee: see Butler v. Chicago R. Co., 155 Mo. App. 287.
Liability to children invitees: see Miller v. Peck Dry Goods Co., 104 Mo. App. 609; Houck v. Chicago R. Co., 116 Mo. App. 559.
Liability where plaintiff departs from or goes beyond the permission or invitation: New York Oil Co. v. Pusey, 211 Fed. 622; Louisville R. Co. v. Sides, 129 Ala. 399; First Nat. Bank v. Chandler, 144 Ala. 286; Coberth v. Great Atlantic Co., 36 App. D. C. 569; Etheredge v. Central R. Co., 122 Ga. 853; Bennett v. Butterfield, 112 Mich. 96; Hutchinson v. Cleveland Iron Co., 141 Mich. 346; Trask v. Shotwell, 41 Minn. 66; Ryerson v. Bathgate, 67 N. J. Law, 337; Gilfillan v. German Hospital, 115 App. Div. 48; Castoriano v. Miller, 15 Misc. 254; Weaver v. Carnegie Steel Co., 223 Pa. St. 238; Hagan v. Delaware Steel Co., 240 Pa. St. 222; Pierce v. Whitcomb, 48 Vt. 127; Peake v. Buell, 90 Wis. 508; Lehmann v. Amsterdam Coffee Co., 146 Wis. 213.
But compare Pauckner v. Wakem, 231 Ill. 276.
Use for purpose not intended by owner or occupier: Thiele v. McManus, 3 Ind. App. 132; Smith v. Trimble, 111 Ky. 861; Ferguson v. Ferguson, (Ky.) 114 S. W. 297; Speicher v. New York Tel. Co., 60 N. J. Law, 242, 59 N. J. Law, 23; Clark v. Fehlhaber, 106 Va. 803. See also Urban v. Focht, 231 Pa. St. 623.
Invitee of licensee: see Brehmer v. Lyman, 71 Vt. 98.
In Cox v. Coulson, [1916] 2 K. B. 177, a spectator in a theatre was injured by the discharge of a pistol during a performance. Bankes, L. J., said: “It seems to me obvious that the duty of the invitor in a case like the present is not only confined to the state of the premises, using that expression as extending to the structure merely. The duty must to some extent extend to the performance given in the structure, because the performance may be of such a kind as to render the structure an unsafe place to be in whilst the performance is going on, or it may be of such a kind as to render the structure unsafe unless some obvious precaution is taken. As an illustration under the latter head I would instance a case where a tight-rope dancer performs on a rope stretched over the heads of the audience. In such a case the provision of a net under the rope to protect the audience in case the performer fell seems so obvious a precaution to take that in the absence of it the premises could not be said to be reasonably safe. In the present case the performance was one which included a discharge of pistols loaded with blank ammunition as one of the incidents. If the pistols had been properly loaded, it is difficult to see that the incident exposed any member of the audience in any ordinarily constructed theatre to any danger. On the other hand, if any one of the pistols was not properly loaded, what would otherwise be a safe performance became an exceedingly dangerous one, and any part of the auditorium might be rendered an extremely unsafe place to be in. Whether the circumstances were such that any negligence or want of proper care can be attributed to the appellant in relation to the loading of the pistol or in relation to the ammunition supplied for that purpose has not been investigated, and I do not think that justice can be done between the parties until this is done.”