Note 124 — Chapter II · NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE (continued 4)

Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Barnett, [1911] A. C. 361; Louisville R. Co. v. Womack, 173 Fed. 752; Chesapeake R. Co. v. Hawkins, 174 Fed. 597; Graysonia Lumber Co. v. Carroll, 102 Ark. 460; Chicago Terminal Co. v. Kotoski, 199 Ill. 383; Neice v. Chicago R. Co., 254 Ill. 595; Jordan v. Grand Rapids R. Co., 162 Ind. 464; Burgess v. Atchison R. Co., 83 Kan. 497; Lando v. Chicago R. Co., 81 Minn. 279; Ingram-Day Lumber Co. v. Harvey, 98 Miss. 11; Koegel v. Missouri R. Co., 181 Mo. 379; Hoberg v. Collins, 80 N. J. Law, 425; Gulf R. Co. v. Dees, 44 Okl. 118; Woodward v. Southern R. Co., 90 S. C. 262; Norfolk R. Co. v. Wood, 99 Va. 156; Huff v. Chesapeake R. Co., 48 W. Va. 45 Accord.

So in case of persons wrongfully upon engines, cars, or trains. Chicago R. Co. v. McDonough, 112 Ill. App. 315; Handley v. Missouri R. Co., 61 Kan. 237; Planz v. Boston R. Co., 157 Mass. 377; Bjornquist v. Boston R. Co., 185 Mass. 130; Feeback v. Missouri R. Co., 167 Mo. 206; Wickenburg v. Minneapolis R. Co., 94 Minn. 276 (boy of twelve); Johnson v. New York R. Co., 173 N. Y. 79; Morgan v. Oregon R. Co., 27 Utah, 92. But see Johnson v. Chicago R. Co., 123 Ia. 224; Pierce v. North Carolina R. Co., 124 N. C. 83. As to who is a trespasser in such a place, see Yancey v. Boston R. Co., 205 Mass. 162.

“A railway company may lawfully require a wilful trespasser upon one of its moving trains to immediately cease his unlawful conduct, by such means as not to indicate a willingness to deprive him of his self-control in leaving the train, the speed of the train not being so great that a personal injury to him should be expected to occur, giving due consideration to the duty of the trespasser to cease his lawlessness by all reasonable means in his power and reasonable expectation that he will use such means in attempting to do it. It is not sufficient to indicate an intentional injury that the party causing it had reasonable ground to expect that such a result was within reasonable probabilities, otherwise a violation of the duty to exercise ordinary care would, of itself, be sufficient to indicate such injury. The danger of inflicting a personal injury upon a person by the conduct of another must be such as to reasonably permit of a belief that such other either contemplated producing it, or, being conscious of the danger that it would occur, imposed such danger upon that person in utter disregard of the consequences, to warrant saying, reasonably, that the circumstances indicate willingness to perpetrate such injury.” Marshall, J., in Bolin v. Chicago R. Co., 108 Wis. 333, 351–352. See also Hoberg v. Collins, 80 N. J. Law, 425, 429. But compare Palmer v. Gordon, 173 Mass. 410; Romana v. Boston R. Co., 226 Mass. 533.