Note 217 — SECTION IV: CHAPTER III

Junot’s numbers at Vimiero are as much disputed as Delaborde’s at Roliça. Among the French accounts the figures vary from 12,500 to 9,200. Foy, usually the most conscientious historian, gives 11,500; Thiébault, both in his narrative, published in 1816, and in his private Mémoires, descends to 9,200. Wellesley estimated the army that he had fought at 14,000 (Well. Disp., iv. 101).

It will be well to give the corps present, and to examine into their probable strength. Just before the landing of the British they had stood as follows (I have arranged them in their new brigading):—

(1) Division Delaborde:—

Brigade Brennier:

2nd Léger (3rd batt.) 1,075

4th Léger (3rd batt.) 1,098

70th of the Line (1st and 2nd batts.) 2,358 = 4,531

Brigade Thomières:

86th of the Line (1st and 2nd batts.) (minus four companies left at Elvas) 1,945

4th Swiss (two companies) 246 = 2,191

(2) Division Loison:—

Brigade Solignac:

12th Léger (3rd batt.) 1,253

15th Léger (3rd batt.) 1,305

58th of the Line (3rd batt.) 1,428 = 3,986

Brigade Charlot:

32nd of the Line (3rd batt.) 1,034

82nd of the Line (3rd batt.) 963 = 1,997

12,705

[(3) Reserve of Grenadiers:—

1st Regiment (1st and 2nd batts.), and 2,100

2nd Regiment (1st and 2nd batts.)

This corps, being formed of companies drawn from every battalion in Portugal, except the three foreign regiments and the Légion du Midi, must not be counted in our first estimate.]

(4) Cavalry Division Margaron:—

1st Provisional Chasseurs 263

3rd Provisional Dragoons 640

4th Provisional Dragoons 589

5th Provisional Dragoons 659

Squadron of volunteer cavalry 100 = 2,251

(5) Artillerymen for 23 guns, engineers, train, &c. 700

15,656

But from this 15,656 large deductions have to be made; each of the eleven line battalions present had given its grenadier company to contribute to the four battalions of ‘Reserve Grenadiers’ which Junot had formed. We must therefore deduct from them about 1,350 bayonets. Delaborde had lost 600 men at Roliça. Loison’s regiments had been thinned by the dépôt battalion left to garrison Almeida, and by his losses in his campaign on the Douro and in the Alemtejo. Thiébault states that the casualties had amounted to 450 during these operations: the details left at Almeida, including many sick, were 1,000 strong, so we must subtract 1,450 from Loison’s total. This is liberal, as some, both of the Almeida force and of the Alemtejo losses, came from regiments not present at Vimiero (e.g. the 1st Hanoverians and the 4th Swiss).

We must make some deduction for the ordinary hospital wastage of the troops which had come out of Lisbon with Delaborde and Junot, seven battalions and two regiments of cavalry. Loison’s sick are already partly accounted for by the Almeida details. It would seem that 1,000 would be an ample allowance. When the French evacuated Portugal they had 3,281 men in hospital. Of these, 1,200 were the wounded of Vimiero. Of the remainder, 1,000 may have belonged to the ten and two-thirds battalions present at the battle, the other 1,081 to the eleven and one-third not present.

For the infantry then we allow—

12,705 of original strength, minus 1,350 Grenadiers, 600 lost at Roliça, and 1,450 in garrison at Almeida or lost in the insurrection, and 1,000 sick (4,400 in all) 8,305

Add for four battalions of Reserve Grenadiers 2,100

Total 10,405

Margaron’s cavalry was practically intact: on July 15 it was 2,151 strong (Thiébault); it hardly suffered in the insurrection. If we allow 300 men for casual losses and troopers on detachment or acting as orderlies, it is ample 1,851

We must add the 100 volunteer horse 100

Lastly, for artillerymen of four batteries (23 guns), engineers and train, &c., we allow 700

Total 13,056

This is not far from Wellesley’s estimate of 14,000 men.