Note 856 — Chapter I · : THE HISTORICAL SCHOOL AND THE CONFLICT OF METHODS

This is what M. Renouvier thinks of this conception: “If we proceed to ask another question in addition to the difficult one already asked and inquire as to the circumstances under which different nations have advanced or declined in the path of goodness and of truth and transmitted their triumphs or their defeats to the next generations, and if we support ourselves in the quest by the belief that we already have some knowledge of a scientific law and consequently of the aim of human society (this kind of knowledge generally begins with formulating such aims), we shall find ourselves in the position of a religious prophet who, not merely content with an inspired version of the truth, and of the destiny of mankind, proceeds to expound to his auditors the necessity under which both preacher and auditors are compelled to believe and to act in accordance with what will undoubtedly come to pass. Philosophical and religious imagination seeks in external observation the elements of a confidence which it can no longer place in itself. History becomes a kind of inspiring divinity. But although the object of the illusion is different its nature is still the same, for the new deity is as little effective as were the ancient ones in the opinion of those who have no faith in it, and it only inspires those who already believe.” (Introduction à la Philosophie analytique de l’Histoire, 2nd ed., vol. i, p. 121.) Bergson’s philosophy also contests the possibility of guessing what the future may be like from the character of the present. See especially Creative Evolution.