Note 321 — Chapter V · ÆSTHETICS AND THEIR INFLUENCE.

This was not the opinion of some person who has annotated the copy of the Essay on Taste (3rd ed., Edinburgh, 1780: the first appeared in 1758) which belongs to the University of Edinburgh, as “wonderfully profound.” Other annotators, however, both of this and the Essay on Genius (1774)—for the University authorities of the past appear to have been somewhat indifferent to the fashion in which students used books—do not agree with him. In plain truth both pieces are rather trying examples of that “saying an infinite deal of nothing” which is so common in philosophical inquiries. “Facility in the conception of an object, if it be moderate, gives us pleasure” (Taste, p. 29); “The rudest rocks and mountains ... acquire beauty when skilfully imitated in painting;” “Where refinement is wanting, taste must be coarse and vulgar” (p. 115). “Perfect criticism requires therefore” (p. 174) “the greatest philosophical acuteness united with the most exquisite perfection of taste.” “The different works of men of genius sometimes differ very much in the degree of their perfection” (Genius, p. 236). “Both in genius for the arts and in genius for science Imagination is assisted by Memory.” Certainly “here be truths,” but a continued course of reading things like them begins before long to inspire a considerable longing for falsehoods. Gerard, however, though habitually dull, is less absurd than Alison, whom he undoubtedly supplied with his principle of Association.