Note 1039 — Chapter II · DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING (continued 3)

Adamson (Development of Modern Philosophy, i. p. 241) takes the opposite view as to what is Kant’s intended teaching, but remarks upon its inconsistency with Kant’s own fundamental principles. “Now, in truth, Kant grievously endangers his own doctrine by insisting on the absence of a priori elements from our apprehension of the mental life; for it follows from that, if taken rigorously, that according to Kant sense and understanding are not so much sources which unite in producing knowledge, as, severally, sources of distinct kinds of apprehension. If we admit at all, in respect to inner sense, that there is some kind of apprehension without the work of understanding, then it has been acknowledged that sense is per se adequate to furnish a kind of apprehension.” As pointed out above (p. 296), by the same line of reasoning Kant is disabled from viewing inner consciousness as merely reflective. In other words it can neither be more immediate nor less sensuous than outer perception. Cf. below, pp. 361, n. 3, 384-5.