Note 196 — Quest. XCI., XCII.

“It may be asked, Is there no reason or nature of things? Yes; as certainly as there are things. But the nature and reason of things, considered independently of the divine Will, or without it, have no more obligation in them, than a divine worship considered independently of, and without any regard to the existence of God. For the Will of God is as absolutely necessary to found all moral obligation upon, as the existence of God is necessary to be the foundation of religious worship. And the fitness of moral obligations, without the Will of God, is only like the fitness of a religious worship without the existence of God.

And it is as just to say, that he destroys the reason of religion and piety, who founds it upon the nature and existence of God, as to say, he saps the foundation of moral obligations, who founds them upon the Will of God. And as religion cannot be justly or solidly defended, but by shewing its connexion with, and dependance upon, God’s existence; so neither can moral obligations be asserted with strength and reason, but by shewing them to be the Will of God.

It may again be asked, Can God make that fit in its self, which is in its self absolutely unfit to be done?

This question consists of improper terms. For God’s Will no more makes actions to be fit in themselves, than it makes things to exist in, or of themselves. No things, nor any actions, have any absolute fitness, and in themselves.

A gift, a blow, the making a wound, or shedding of blood, considered in themselves, have no absolute fitness, but are fit or unfit according to any variety of incidental circumstances.

When therefore God, by his Will, makes any thing fit to be done, he does not make the thing fit in its self, which is just in the same state considered in its self, as it was before; but, it becomes fit for the person to do it, because he can be happy, or do that which is fit for him to do, by doing the Will of God.

For instance, the bare eating a fruit, considered in its self, is neither fit nor unfit. If a fruit be appointed by God for our food and nourishment, then it is as fit to eat it, as to preserve our lives. If a fruit be poisonous, then it is as unfit to eat it, as to commit self-murder. If eating of a fruit be prohibited by an express order of God, then it is as unfit to eat it, as to eat our own damnation.

But in none of these instances is the eating or not eating, considered in its self, fit or unfit; but has all its fitness, or unfitness, from such circumstances, as are entirely owing to the Will of God.

Supposing, therefore, God to require a person to do something, which, according to his present circumstances, without that command, he ought not to do, God does not make that which is absolutely unfit in itself, fit to be done; but only adds new circumstances to an action, that is neither fit nor unfit, moral nor immoral in itself, but because of its circumstances.

To instance, in the case of Abraham required to sacrifice his son. The killing of a man is neither good nor bad, considered absolutely in its self. It was unlawful for Abraham to kill his son, because of the circumstances he was in with regard to his son. But when the divine Command was given, Abraham was in a new state; the action had new circumstances; and then it was as lawful for Abraham to kill his son, as it was lawful for God to require any man’s life, either by sickness, or any other means he should please to appoint.

And it had been as unlawful for Abraham to have disobeyed God in this extraordinary command, as to have cursed God at any ordinary calamity of providence.—

Again, it is objected, If there be nothing right or wrong, good or bad, antecedently and independently of the Will of God, there can be no reason, why God should will, or command one thing, rather than another.

It is answered, first, That all goodness, and all possible perfection, is as eternal as God, and as essential to him as his existence. And to say, that they are either antecedent or consequent, dependent or independent of his Will, would be equally absurd. To ask, therefore, whether there be not something right and wrong, antecedent to the Will of God, to render his Will capable of being right, is as absurd, as to ask for some antecedent cause of his existence, that he may be proved to exist necessarily. And to ask, how God can be good, if there be not something good independently of him, is asking how he can be infinite, if there be not something infinite independently of him. And, to seek for any other source or reason of the divine Goodness, besides the divine Nature, is like seeking for some external cause, and help of the divine omnipotence.

The goodness and wisdom, therefore, by which God is wise and good, and to which all his works of wisdom and goodness are owing, are neither antecedent, nor consequent to his Will.—”

Human reason.