Note 183 — Quest. XII., XIII.

“Certainly, it is not to be understood, in a literal or strict sense, that He does, all that is done. ‘Far be it from God,’ says Elihu, ‘that he should do wickedness: and from the Almighty, that he should commit iniquity.’ Doing wickedness, and committing iniquity, are synonymous phrases: but to impute to the Most High, any thing like what is commonly meant by either of these phrases, is evident blasphemy.

“Nor are we to imagine, certainly, that God makes his creatures do, whatever is done by them, in any such manner as is inconsistent with their own proper agency. Rational creatures certainly act; and act as freely, as if there were no being above them to direct their steps, or to govern their actions. When God works in men, to will and to do that which is good; they, nevertheless will and do it themselves; and are really praise-worthy. And he does not, surely, so influence any to evil, as to render them unactive, involuntary, or undeserving of blame.

“Nor do I believe it true, literally and strictly speaking, that God creates, whatsoever comes to pass; particularly darkness, and moral evil.

“But this must not be taken for granted, nor hastily passed over: because, however indisputable, it is disputed. There are some among us, and some who are deservedly in reputation for wisdom, and general soundness in the faith; who appear to be of opinion, that God is the direct Author—the immediate Cause—the proper Creator, of all evil, as well as of all good—of all sin, as well as holiness, in heart and life—in thought, word, and deed.

“This opinion, however, notwithstanding my high esteem and particular friendship for some of the holders of it, I am not yet ready to adopt, for several reasons.

“1. To suppose that the actions of men, whether virtuous or vicious, are created, seems to confound all distinction between creation and Providence; or rather, wholly to exclude the latter.

“The work of creation, we used to think, was God’s making creatures and things, at first; or giving the beginning of existence to matter and minds, with their various properties, instincts and organizations. And that God’s works of Providence, were his preserving things already made, and governing all their operations. But according to this new philosophy, creation is all; Providence is nothing. For what preserving and governing of creatures or actions can there be, when every creature and every action, is every moment created anew? An action, a thought, or volition, whether good or evil, is a new and strange kind of creature, or created thing. But, in a theological view, the question before us is of chief importance, as it respects moral evil. I add, therefore;

“2. It appears to me, that to suppose God the Creator of sin, whether in principle or action, is hardly reconcilable with his perfect holiness. ‘Doth a fountain send forth, at the same place, sweet waters and bitter?’ Can darkness proceed from Him, as its proper source, in whom there is no darkness at all?

“It is true, God has created many things which are of a different nature from himself; as the bodies of men and beasts, and all parts of the world of matter: but nothing, I conceive, directly opposite to his own nature; as is sin. The sun is the immediate cause of the growth of vegetables; though these are essentially different from the sun itself: but it is not thus the cause of ice and darkness; which are no more of a contrary nature to it, than sin is to the nature of God.^[184]

“I am sensible it has been said, there is no more inconsistency with the holiness of God, in supposing him the efficient, immediate cause of sin, for necessary good purposes; than in supposing he only permits it, for wise ends, and so orders things that he knows it will be committed.

“But these two ways of accounting for the existence of moral evil, appear to me materially different. There are supposable cases in which it would be right for a man, not to hinder another from sinning, when he could hinder him; and also to place him in circumstances of temptation, expecting that he would sin. For instance, a parent may leave money in the way of a child suspected of being given to theft; and may conceal himself and let the child steal it; with a view to correct him, in order to reclaim him, or as a warning to his other children. All this might be perfectly right in the parent; however certainly he might know, that the child would be guilty of the expected crime. But I question whether any case can be supposed in which it would not be wrong, directly to influence another to do evil, that good might come. Exciting one to sin by power or persuasion; and placing one in circumstances of trial, wherein he would be tempted to sin, without restraining him from it, are surely different things, although the certainty of his sinning may be the same.

“3. I dare not think that God creates sin, and all kinds of evil, because this seems plainly contrary to the general current of the holy scriptures.

“In the first chapter of Genesis, it is said, ‘God saw every thing that he had made, and, behold, it was very good.’ Of his making two great lights, we are told; and that he made the stars also: but no account is there given of his creating darkness. Respecting our own species, the inspired historian particularly informs us, that ‘God created man in his own image: in the image of God created he him: male and female created he them.’ Nor do we find in that book, or in all the Bible, that he hath since ever created them otherwise. Solomon three thousand years after the fall, having made diligent search among men and women, to find out their true character, and the cause of their so universal depravity, says; ‘Lo, this only have I found, that God made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions.’ Wicked practices, and deceitful inventions to conceal their criminality, are ever ascribed in scripture to mankind themselves, or to other fallen creatures, and never to God, as their efficient cause.

“In the New-Testament, christians are said to be ‘created unto good works:’ and we read of ‘the new man, which after God, is created in righteousness and true holiness’. But no where do we read of any one that was created unto evil works; or after Satan in unrighteousness and sin. It is written, 1 Cor. xiv. 33, ‘God is not the author of confusion, but of peace.’ And James i. 13-17, ‘Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man: but every man is tempted when he is led away of his own lust and enticed.—Do not err, my beloved brethren. Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights.’ Can any thing be more express to teach us, that a distinction ought carefully to be made between the origin of good and evil; and that we should not conceive them both alike to come from God?

“For scripture proof that God is not the efficient author of sin, I will only add, that the fruits of the Spirit, and works of the flesh, are set in contrast and spoken of as diametrical opposites: whereas, did God create sinful propensities in men, or directly influence them to evil actions, the works of the flesh would be as real and immediate fruits of the divine Spirit, as the holiest exercises of the best saints.

“4. I see no occasion for the supposition of God’s being thus the author of all evil: nor any good ends that it can answer.

“Could it be seen how evils might be accounted for, without supposing them any part of the creation of God; and how God might have an absolute dominion over all events, without being the immediate cause of bad things; no good man, I conclude, would wish to conceive of Him as being thus the proper source of darkness and evil. And indeed, were it so, that our weak minds were unable to comprehend how God can work all things after the counsel of his own will, or how natural and moral evil could ever have been, without believing that God is as much, and as immediately, the cause of evil as of good; yet it might be more modest, and more wise, to leave these among other incomprehensibles, than to have recourse to so bold an hypothesis for the solution of them. But, I apprehend, there is no need of this hypothesis in order to account for the existence of evil, or in order to an understanding belief of the universal government of the Most High.

“Evils, of most if not all kinds, are such negative things—such mere defects, in their origin at least, as do not need creation, or require a positive omnipotent cause. This is the case, evidently, with respect to natural darkness: it is only the want of light. This is the case, also, with respect to natural death: it is only the cessation, the loss, the want of life. And this may be the case, with respect to spiritual darkness, and spiritual death. It has heretofore been the orthodox opinion, that all moral evil consists radically in privation; or, that unholiness, at bottom, is the mere want of holiness. And, notwithstanding all the floods of light, from various quarters, which have come into the world in this age of new discoveries, possibly this one old opinion may yet be true. ‘God made man upright.’ That is, He formed him with a disposition impartially just and good: He created in him a principle of universal righteousness. When man fell, by eating the forbidding fruit, this principle had not been preserved in perfect strength and exercise. In consequence of that disobedience, the divine internal influence was so withdrawn, that this principle was entirely lost. But we are not told, nor need it be supposed, that any opposite principle was then created in him. Our first parents had, I believe, in their original formation, all the radical instincts of nature which they had after the fall; or which any of their posterity now have. Such as a principle of self-preservation, a desire of self-promotion, and a propensity to increase and multiply; together with all the more particular appetites and passions, subservient to these purposes. All these are innocent in themselves, though not in themselves virtuous. But these private instincts, when left to operate alone, without the governing influence of a public spirit, or a just regard for other beings, will naturally lead to all manner of iniquity, in heart and life. To avarice and ambition; to envy and malice; to intemperance and lewdness; to frauds and oppressions; to wars and fightings.

“There is no need of supposing any other divine agency, than only to uphold in existence creatures that have lost their virtue, amidst surrounding temptations, in order to account for all the evil affections which we ever feel, and for all the external wickedness that is ever committed. Nor, in order to the holiest creatures losing their virtue, need any thing more be supposed on God’s part, than only his leaving them to themselves; or not upholding in them, and constantly invigorating, a virtuous disposition.

“And as, in this way, we can account for the existence of all manner of evil; so we can thus understand how it is possible for God to bring about whatsoever comes to pass, without his being the actor, or maker, or instigator, of any thing that is not perfectly good. When He does not cause light, there will be darkness. When He does not make peace, there will be evil. The darkness takes place according to his appointment, with the same exactness and certainty, as if He actually created it; and so does evil of every kind. What He determines to permit, knowing perfectly the circumstances and dispositions of every agent concerned, will as infallibly come to pass, as what he determines to do himself, or to effect by his own positive influence. The king’s heart, and the rivers of water; the waves of the sea, and the tumults of the people, are in the hand of the Lord, to all important intents and purposes, if it be only true that He restrains them, or lets them run; stilleth them, or suffereth them to rage, just as he sees fit.

“In this sense, I conceive, it is to be understood, that God forms the light, and creates darkness; makes peace, and creates evil. He has the absolute government—the perfect control—the entire superintendency, of all these things.

“When any folly has been committed or any mischief has been done, some are ready to say, It was so ordered; as if therefore nobody was to be blamed. But this is a false inference, from just premises. True, it was so ordered of God; and ordered righteously and wisely: but it was so ordered by the doer of the mischief also; and ordered carelessly, perhaps, or wickedly. You will say, It must have been so, and the actor could not have done otherwise: but, I say, he might have done otherwise, if he would. It is true, there is a kind of necessity in the actions of men. They necessarily act according to their own choice; and they necessarily choose to act according to their own disposition. Under this kind of necessity God himself acts. It is impossible for him to do, because it is impossible for him to will that which is contrary to his own nature. He necessarily wills and does, what is agreeable to his moral perfections. But such a necessity as this, is so far from being inconsistent with freedom, that it is essential to all free agency. Actions which can and do take place, contrary to the inclination of the agent, are not his actions. He has no command over them; and therefore can deserve no praise or blame for them.

“The necessity of acting according to our own minds, is all the necessity which need be supposed, when we suppose that all our actions were decreed, and are ordered of God. A creature that acts according to any laws of nature, and not at perfect random, without any self-government, acts in such a manner that He who knows what is in him, may fore-know all his actions; and in such a manner that He in whose hand his times are, may govern all his volitions. Men follow their several courses, as freely as the rivers of water, and with a higher kind of freedom; yet, since they run agreeably to their own inclination, and cannot do otherwise, a Being omniscient and omnipotent, can calculate before hand all their motions; can keep them in the channels decreed for them, and can turn them whithersoever he will. If any do not comprehend this, yet let them not think they so fully comprehend the contrary, as to feel certain, that either man cannot be free, or God cannot govern the world. Certainly the providential government of God, over the hearts and ways of men, though most absolute, is not such but that, if they do well, they are praise-worthy; and if they do not well, the sin lieth at their own door.

“Neither let it be imagined that the criminality of a bad action is taken away, or at all extenuated, because it will be over-ruled for good. Actions are good or evil, according to the nature of them, and the intention of the agent, and not according to undesigned consequences. When we act wickedly, and with a wicked mind, its being productive of happy effects, alters nothing in regard to our blame-worthiness. In the divine decrees, and in the divine providence, ‘Whatever is, is right:’ but in the conduct of creatures, many things that are, are not at all the less wrong. God’s governing all things, so as to make them subserve his wise and holy designs, should not lead us to think any more favourably of our own, or of our neighbour’s foolish and sinful actions.”

Smalley’s Sermons.